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I have discussed the issues raised in this paper with a large 
number of colleagues at Michigan and at the Center for Advanced 
Studies in the Behavioral Sciences: Joseph Berger, Philip 
Converse, Claude Fischer, Anne Scott, Albert J. Rothenberg, 
Andrew Scott, Sheldon Stryker, Margaret Somers, William Sewell, 
Jr., Charles Tilly, and Robert W. Scott. They are not responsible 
for its sins of omission or commission. 
Sociology as a Discipline: 
Quasi-Science and Quasi-Humanities 
Every once in a while it is useful to take stock of where we 
stand as a collective enterprise. Most of us go about our daily 
business of teaching, writing, and research -- of professional 
and civic participation, without reexamining our fundamental 
premises-- the views of what we are doing and why we are doing it 
that we work out early in our scholarly careers. But occasionally 
we ought to take stock, to ask if our original conceptions were 
correct, to reassess the options. If our original assessments 
were wrong, or partially misguided, we ought to ask how they were 
' wrong and what steps we might take to change the directions of 
research and writing. 
In this paper I would like to sketch a view of the 
discipline of sociology quite different than the one I was taught 
in introductory sociology almost forty years ago, and that is 
often still taught in undergraduate and graduate courses in 
secular universities. This view, what might be called "the 
becoming a science" view of the discipline, was there at the 
beginning of sociology in the writings of Comte. In the United 
States it intensified after World War 11, as operationalism, 
logical positivism, and quantitative techniques gave a 
distinctive coloration to the science of society. The becoming a 
science view continues to influence the world view of many of my 
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colleagues. It shapes how we teach, how we structure the 
graduate curriculum, what we reward in scholarship. 
In my view "the becoming a science" view is partial and 
limiting. We are a quasi-science, but we are also quasi- 
humanistic.1 Because we have denied our ties to the humanities, 
we have missed many options and we have often mis-specified our 
intellectual problems. On the other hand, although we are 
quasi-humanistic, I hold little brief for those who believe that 
sociology ought to give up its connections to scientific method 
and explanation, who reject out-of-hand positivism, empirical 
evidence, and . concern for the scope of generalizati'on and the 
range of its application. There certainly is room for that point 
of view, and some scholars and departments may well pursue that 
vision whole heartedly. But I think it would be a mistake for 
the discipline as a whole to commit itself to a view of itself as 
solely humanistic.  ore about that later). 
The "becoming a sciencen view, especially as it crystallized 
around mid-century, entailed a set of subsidiary ideas about 
measurement, the role of theory, statisitics and mathematics, the 
nature of proof and disproof, and epistemological and 
ontological assumptions. The "becoming a science" view was in 
bondage not only to abstract conceptions of science, but to a 
particular science--physics. Thus, the image of how science was 
built and how it cumulates was heavily shaped by the 
architectonics of physics. I believe the unitary and hierachical 
model of science which we borrowed from physics has led many of 
us to seriously misunderstand the structural possibilities for 
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our own discipline. And, pollyanna that I am, it has led us to 
underestimate the enormous progress we have made in the many 
arenas of our expertise. If we are to understand ourselves as a 
quasi-scientific community, it is important that we have a 
realistic view of the variety of sciences, rather than hold to an 
inappropriate and unrealistic model for ourselves. 
If we are to understand ourself as quasi-scientific guasi- 
humanistic, we also have to have a sense of how knowledge 
cumulates and changes in the several humanistic disiciplines. In 
some sense this is terra incognita, for both sociologists and 
philosophers have paid much more attention to the processes by 
which scholars warrant knowlege in the sciences than in the 
humanities. 
Two prefatory comments are in order before I develop my 
theme: First, although I have read in the philosophy and 
sociology of science, I claim no expertise as a philosopher of 
knowledge or as a sociologist of science.2 The arguments 
presented here are a result of my reflections on the course of 
sociology during my life time; they are not based on a deep 
reading of epistemology or a reconsideration of the fundamental. 
object-subject problem which leads some interpretative 
sociologists to question our status as a science. My own 
intellectual commitments have been to middle range theory 
development of an explanatory kind. I am not rejecting those 
commitments. 
Second, although this paper is addressed to the status of 
sociology as a discipline, in varying degrees the comments could 
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be applied to other social sciences, as well. They apply least 
to anthropology, much of which has been closer to the humanities 
all along. (~ndeed, the problem for cultural anthropology may 
well be that it has lost its ties to generalizing science.) They 
apply to political science, especially of the behavioral and 
modeling persuasions. Unfortunately, political theorists dealing 
with classical themes until recently have felt too much on the 
defensive and too walled off from the behavioral mainstream to 
be of much use in challenging the intellectual limits of the 
mainstream. The comments apply to economics, although that 
benighted discipline is largely lost to a dialogue on these 
issues. Mainstream economics combines an unthinking commitment to 
Popperian methodology [see Blaug, 19801, a neo-classical model of 
marginal analysis, and a reification of markets that, taken 
together, seals it off from these debates. The reification of 
the market gives them a natural object and marginal analyis is 
their all encompassing theory. The comments also apply to the 
less biologically linked aspects of psychology. Since it is 
difficult enough to get my own colleagues to face the problem I 
want to address, and since I know less about the other 
disciplines, I will not comment in any detail on the application 
of my reflections to sister social sciences. 
In the next section I discuss the making of sociology as a 
collective project. The becoming a science model was chosen not 
only because of its intellectual attractiveness, but because it 
also facilitated our legitmation and status achievement in the 
larger academy. The becoming a science model carried with it a 
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limited image of the scientific project. In the second section I 
briefly discuss alternative models of science and their 
implications for cumulation in sociology. 
I then turn to a discussion of problem formulation in 
sociology. I want to argue that many of our problems come 
externally from politics and civilization as lived, not from an 
internal disciplinary concern with puzzles about fundamental and 
universal aspects of human life. If that is correct, our 
processes of problem selection and'formulation have much in 
comin6n with the processes and issues of historic concern in the 
humanities. The third section presents a discussion of S O C ~ O ~ O ~ ~  
as a humanistic discipline, but, alas, a poor one. That we are 
partially scienctific and partially humanistic has 
implications not only for the nature of problem formulation and . 
reformulation, but for methodology and the cumulation of 
knowledge as well. The paper concludes with a discussion of the 
programmatic implications of my alternative view. 
My central thesis is that we are at best a quasi-science; 
that built into our subject matter are real limits to how 
scientific we can become. Moreover, because our core 
preocupations and many of our specific research interests come 
from civilization as lived, not from an unfolding view of 
universal and fundamental properties., we are constantly 
rejuvenated by the traditions and issues posed by our changing 
civilization. Not only are we quasi-humanistic, but we are a 
moral-political enterprise. For many sociologists, certainly not 
all, the motives for participating in the discipline come.from 
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commitments to political and social change. Life experiences, 
both inside and outside the discipline, change and channel those 
motivations.4 
The Collective Mobility Proiect of Socioloav 
The creation of an academic discipline, much as the creation . 
of a profession, can be thought of as a collective project. 
Students of the professions (see M. Sarfatti-Larson, 1977) use 
the concept of a collective project (or "collective mobility 
projectn)to focus upon the implicit goals of loosely coordinated 
people aimed at enhancing some collectivity to which they belong. 
The collective projects of disciplines have two major components- 
-intellectual, the forms and kinds of knowledge and values the 
discipline wants to enhance, and occupational, the ideology, 
organization, and command of resources, including status, that 
the collective wants inorder to justify and enhance itself in the 
academic and larger community. 
The two components, intellectual and occupational, should 
not be thought of as distinct, but as interlocked aspects of the 
overall collective project. That is, intellectual choices 
require different kinds and amounts of resources and a social 
organization of disciplinary resources that are dependent upon 
societal support.(~o give a concrete example, contrast the needs 
of national and international sampling frames in public opinion 
research as contrasted with the resources needed and organization 
of ethnomethodological work.) The provision of societal support 
is related to the valuation of the products of intellectual 
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choice and affects the distribution of prestige and status within 
the profession and to the profession as a whole. 
The intellectual project of sociology was to become a (the?) 
science of society. Our concept of a science had two major 
components, methodological, the development of objective 
indicators and standardized measurement of social phenomena, and 
theoretical, the development of nomothetic laws and theories 
stating universal relations among precisely defined concepts. I 
return to the intellectual component later. 
How did the scientific project tie to an occupational 
ideology? The scientific project served to enhance our prestige 
and ability to gain resources by linking us to the prestige of 
the natural sciences. They had had great success in'gaining 
entry to the academy, in gaining government support for research, 
in achieving prestige in the society. It was not always thus, of 
course, and each of the natural sciences has in its own time 
conducted a collective mobility project. Daniel Kevles (1978) has 
described the transformation of physics as a disciplinary project 
in almost these terms. If we could claim to be a science, with 
an ability to find strong laws and predict non-obvious 
relationships, surely society would recognize our value. Even the 
choice of the term "behavioral sciences," commonly used right 
after World War 11, was part of the attempt to nestle closer to 
the images of a hard, objective, rigorous discipline. The looser 
and softer term "social sciences" was both fuzzy and less 
politically acceptable. 
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At the same time, becoming a science would separate 
sociology from its ties to social reform, social work, and the 
social gospel. Even though empirical sociology had flourished at 
Chicago partly by studying the under-class (e,g, The Ghetto, The 
Jackroller, The Hobo, Gold Coast and the Slum, The Polish 
Peasant), there was a difference between studying the underclass 
and trying to help it. As Everett Hughes delighted in pointing 
out, the status of professionals is partly determined by the 
social class of their clientele. Professionals are also known by 
the professional company they keep. We needed to dissociate 
ourselves from reformism and social work. If we were to become a 
science, we had to refrain from giving advice until we had 
adequate knowledge. Sociology could not be an applied discipline 
. . 
until a tested body of knowledge existed. It was acceptable for 
professional schools to give advice, for schools of business to 
train practitioners and consultants, but the most sociology 
should do is teach the discipline. It was within our mandate to 
describe organizational practice, or study the incidence of 
"nuts, sluts and perverts," as the study of social problems was 
sometimes called. But description didn't imply designing change. 
Avoiding social action had another benefit: it made us 
acceptable to the administrators and boards of trustees who paid 
the bills. In Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the 
Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865-1905, Mary 
Furner (1975) shows how reformist economists and social 
scientists had to pull in their horns and how disciplines shifted 
the boundaries of the acceptable. By 1950 avoidance of social 
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action had become an occupational ideology. Of course, claims of 
objectivity and value neutrality also served to emulate the 
standards of science and helped to create an internal consensus 
about the tasks of the discipline. 
The benefits of becoming a basic science and separating from 
social work and social reform (even though a concern with social 
conditions and social problems was part of most sociologists' 
motivation for seeking out sociology) were fairly explicit in 
discussions about sociology. What was less explicitly discussed 
was our relations to the humanities. 
Academic disciplines, like professions, claim expertise 
over arenas of knowledge. As Andrew Abbott (1988) forcefully 
argues, there is a contest, implicit and explicit, for control of 
the arena of the production and application of knowledge. The 
social sciences grew out of the humanistic disciplines, 
especially philosophy, beginning to separate and became 
institutionalized after the Civil War in America. Of course, 
there was (and is) no one model that underlies the humanities 
disciplines, so a contrast of sociology with them is necessarily 
selective. By the time of the great depression, the contrast was 
quite sharp. The contrast was both intellectual and 
occupational. One thing the humanities disciplines did share 
was that they were not rising disciplines. Classics and 
philosophy, once rising disciplines in relation to the study of 
Christian theology, had been displaced as queens of the academy 
by the natural sciences and there was little to be gained by 
attempting to emulate them. Unlike Great Britain, for instance, 
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where the ramparts of civil service professionalism were 
dominated by those who had studied "the Greats" and science was 
still finding it hard to break into elite institutions, in the 
United States the humanities presented a pallid, dare I say 
effete, image. They represented the past, the conserving of past 
class and cultural dominance, not the new, progressing forces. 
Intellectually, the humanities were rejected for a variety 
of reasons. Philosophy had normative overtones and was an 
armchair discipline. Only philosophy of science was of much use 
to social scientists. Classics was a descriptive account of past 
civilizations. Since we were to stand outside of our own cultural 
'and civilizational biases, the axial concerns and alternatives of 
our own civilization were of little use to us. Literature was 
textual and aesthetic. There may be truths in a poem or novel, 
but.they were not our kinds of truth. The truths of literature 
could not be stated in propositional and variable language. They 
provided individualized insights, not generalizations. 
History, then as now, stood in a different relation to the 
social sciences. By the end of World War I 1  social history had 
emerged and economic interpretations of political institutions 
were quite common. Still most social scientists rejected history 
as an ally or a model. Much of history used political biography 
as a major part of its lens on the world. The focus on 
individuals and the action of individual leaders as a means of 
reading social change was methodologically rejected by the 
generalizing social sciences. Historians read their empirical 
observations from residual archives, not from systematic samples 
of populations. Most importantly, the focus on explaining 
singular events, on describing and explaining periods in local 
context, was quite opposed to the generalizing ethos of the 
emerging social sciences. Although the grand theorists of 
cyclical transformation, such as Spengler, Toynbee, and Mumford 
were referred to in courses on social change, there was no middle 
ground. Comparative historical sociology had few if any 
exemplars. Some comparative sociology did exist, in the work of 
students of revolution (Brinton, a historian, Petty, Edwards) and 
in writings on the sociology of religion. But, by and large, 
history as a discipline was in another world. 
Playing the science card worked. As a collective mobility 
project the social sciences in general and sociology in 
particular moved from a peripheral position in the academy to, if 
not a central position, at least a fairly well established one. 
We became established in almost every university. Except for a 
few holdouts, where as matters of convenience we are lodged with 
- anthropology, we were granted status as separate departments . 
Student demand has been strong enough that in most universities 
we are the fourth or fifth largest social science department-- 
behind history, economics, and psychology,-- sometimes larger 
sometimes smaller than political science (depending upon the 
class structure of the university; political science as a 
training ground for lawyers is larger in elite universities),-- 
usually ahead of anthropology and geography. Government 
agencies and foundations recognized the value of social science 
in investigating basic and applied phenomena. The National 
Science Foundation coded us in with other social sciences. Large 
amounts of money have been spent for the collection of data on 
de-politicized social concerns (e.f., the election process, 
demographic phenomena, social epidemiology and medical 
sociology). Where history and ph'ilosophy had to wait until the 
establishment of the National Endowment for the Humanities in the 
early 1970s to rec.eive Federal funds-for projects and 
fellowships, we began to receive Federal funding in the 1930s 
(for rural sociology), had a substantial growth in funding in the 
1950s, and remain much better funded than the humanities today. . 
Another measure of our success can be seen in the opening up 
of the elite positions of the academy to sociologists. It is no 
longer rare to find sociologists as Deans, Provosts and even 
Presidents of universities and colleges. And it is the elite as 
well as the non-elite colleges that are selecting sociologists as 
senior administrators. Sociologists such as Harrison White, 
William Sewell., Ronald Freedman, and Charles Tilly have been 
elected to the National Academy of Sciences. Sociologists such 
as Tilly, Converse, Bell, Merton, Shils, Bellah, Gusfield, and 
Smelser participate in the councils of the peak learned 
societies, such as the American Philosophical Society, the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science, the American 
Council of Learned Societies, and the American Institute of Arts 
and Letters. 
Intellectually, the success of the collective project shows 
in the patterns of diffusion of ideas, methods and theories. A 
few years ago a survey of political scientists found that the AJS 
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and ASR were two of the most widely read journals in political 
science (in the top ten). Almost every profession now borrows 
sociological theory and methods for investigating their patterns 
of client usage, institutional structure, and service adequacy. 
Modern historical study is almost unthinkeable without a heavy 
infusion of sociological conceptualization and analysis, 
acknowledged or not. Indeed, the infusion of sociological and 
more recently anthropological concerns in history has created a 
sense of embattlement among practitioners of the older narrative 
and political styles. (Himmelfarb, 1987) 
In spite of this success; we are not so well established 
.that our' intellectual accomplishments overwhelm the society at 
large, academic administrators or colleagues in other 
disciplines. When bad times come to universities, sociology l'ooks 
somewhat expendable. (We are lucky to have geography around. When 
hard times come, if a university does not have a geography 
department to axe, it looks to sociology.) .Research funders and 
reviewers sometime wonder what they are getting from the 
enterprise and we do not receive strong support from natural 
scientists when Congress is being lobbied. (Indeed, it often 
seems as if Congressmen have to convince the natural scientists 
to accept money for us.) Scholars in other disciplines feel 
little compunction about evaluating and commenting on 
sociological productions. A measure of turf domination might well 
be the extent to which members of other disciplines believe they 
can directly evaluate sociological work during tenure decisions, 
rather than relying upon expert opinion from within the 
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discipline. It is clear that sociologists don't evaluate 
mathematicians and that even art historians are more autonomous 
than we. 
I want to argue that we are a different kind of science than 
we thought we could be, and by not articulating with a resurgent 
set of humanities disciplines, we are less of a scholarly 
enterprise than we ought to be. 
Becomina a Science and the Cumulation of Knowledae 
That we have become widely accepted in the academy is clear. 
That sociological concepts and methods are widely used both in 
and outside of academia is clear. But becoming a science.implies 
more than using or aping scientific methods; it implies more than 
developing conceptual distinctions and categories that highlight 
the human landscape. Becoming a science implies some kind of 
criterion of progress, of evidence that error is eliminated and 
truth is approximated, that theories that make more sense of the 
facts will supplant weaker theories.3 
When we reflect upon our status as a discipline many of us 
rejoice in the richness of our concepts and the vast number of 
topics that have been rendered amenable to systematic observation 
and analysis. Moreover, there are a large number of approaches 
and methods that may be applied to any given topic--historical, 
hermeneutic, case analysis, sample surveys, and on. However, it 
is this very profusion of topics, theoretical ideas, 
presuppositions and methodological approaches that leads us to be 
a "low consensus discipline" (See the debate between Lowell 
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Hargens and Stephen Cole, Gary Simon and Jonathan Cole, 1988, as 
well as references cited therein.) 
That we have such a profusion of approaches and topics and 
that we are a low consensus discipline is sometimes taken as a 
sign that we are a proto-science, not quite there yet. We await 
the great systematizers (parsons?) or simplifiers (~omans?) who 
will establish a common language and overarching frame for the 
analysis of social life. Of course, I cannot disprove that that 
is a possibility for the future. It may happen. But the history 
of the last forty years points in quite the opposite direction, 
the multiplication of specializations and approaches. 
Not only are there more specializations but they do not 
relate in a clear architectonics. Current attempts to map micro- 
meso-macro linkages is an attempt to unify different levels of 
analysis, and is thus a move toward an integrated architectonic 
for the discipline. But looking for such linkages is by itself 
without theoretical content. If there are many different kinds of 
linkages and many different kinds of analyses at each level, a 
unified theory will not emerge. 
Later I am going to argue that one source of the profusion 
of topics and approaches is based in our situation as a quasi- 
humanities: our problems come from civilization as lived, from 
our deep enmeshment in our own civilization's concerns and 
traditions.. But here I want to argue that scientific progress can 
occur without unification and that the image of a science as a 
unified entity may well be inappropriate for sociology. 
16 
one approach to unification has been through global 
mathematical models. Although mathematical sociology is alive 
and well, modern modellers, by and large, take on small networks 
of relations. The global encompassing model of a Stuart Dodd has 
passed from the scene. Although Robert Hamblin's sociological 
application of S.S. Stephen's psychometric function has been 
quite ambitious, it has not been widely emulated or adopted. 
~nthropologist Roy D'Andrade (in ~ i s k e  and Shweder, 1985) 
suggests one reason mathematical unification is unlikely. He 
argues that there are three major groups of sciences--what he 
labels physical science, natural science, and semiotic science. 
Physical sciences--physics,.chemistry, parts.of earth'sciences 
and astronomy are characterized in terms of a set of 
mathematically described and interrelated set of concepts. 
Mathematicization was important both for solving internal. 
problems and for creating an aura of wonder in the society at 
large. These disciplines resemble Hempel's covering law model 
of sciences, in which the phenomena under study are captured in 
universal statements that hold in all places and time. The 
natural sciences-- much of biology and the social sciences , are 
desribed as systems of interconnected mechanisms. D'Andrade 
notes, for instance, that molecular genetics has made enormous 
progress with hardly a mathematical equation. Models of systems 
are created and mechanisms for switching components are isolated. 
The models are more context dependent. "The description of DNA is 
thus, not the description of a law, but the description of a 
complex contingent mechanism." (p. 21) The texture of these kinds 
of sciences is lumpy, made up of various components, each 
' described in static and dynamic terms. DIAndrade argues that 
social systems can be described in these terms as well. The 
analysis of capitalism can proceed as if it were a natural 
system. But he also argues that in the case of much of social 
science, our systems are constructed within a context of meaning. 
(He notes that much of modern social psychology, which pretends 
to be studying universal elements, is actually a kind of modern 
ethnography, elucidating constrained and socially constructed 
behavior within the contemporary world.) Understanding changes 
in the context of meaning. requires semiotic approaches. For 
DIAndrade understanding social systems and social behavior 
requires both natural science and semiotic approaches. 
(Dl~ndrade's list of the semiotic sciences is stronger on-the 
hard ones, linqucstics, and a little weak on the soft ones, 
textual hermeneutics. He is silent on the relation of the 
semiotic disciplines to the humanistic ones.) 
If there was a master social system that could be analyzed 
as a natural system, our work would be vastly simplified. 
Something approaching a unified social science would be possible. 
Strange bedfellows they may be, but world systems theory and 
micro-economic analysis present themselves as explanatory 
approaches to the master social system. But there have been many 
natural social systems in that different societies have existed 
but with little contact or continuity with each other. Moreover, 
even the modern world is coupled, but not tightly coupled. And 
there were in the past even more loosely coupled systems. The 
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components change. The loose coupling of the system is one source 
of the profusion of topics and approaches in sociology-- 
institutional domains, e.g., religion, family, law, politics, 
sciene, art, cannot be reduced to a single analytic model. (cf. 
Friedland and Alford, 1987) 
If one of the tasks of sociology as science is to describe 
and explain the many loosely coupled components of the social 
world, the profusion of sub-disciplines and topics should not be 
surprising. However, that does not mean that progress does not 
occur, but the progress is in accumulating knowledge within the 
local contexts of sub-disciplines and invisible colleges. 
Moreover, the texture of knowledge, the form of 
generalization, and the linkage of empirical statement to 
concept and theory will vary depending upon the problem set, the 
methodological commitments, the style of data collection and the 
. , 
form of conceptualization in each particular arena. 
Ethnomethodologists have made progress in understanding how 
intersubjectivity is achieved. They develop inference rules and 
concepts from deep descriptions and analysis of small units of 
interaction. Social demography has specified the components of 
the income differentials between the races. The components are , 
described in econometric equations that yield quantitative 
empirical generalizations. Both have made important advances in 
knowledge. But the form of the realizations of these advances is 
vastly different. 
The implication of this argument is that sociology as a 
science has made substantial progress. In almost every area of 
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sociology we can make statements based on evidence and theory 
that we could not have made thirty or forty years ago. We can 
say why statements made at the earlier time are wrong or partial. 
At the same time, the way in which growth and problem 
shifts occur in sociology is bewildering. We multiply concepts 
and specializations and take up and drop problems. At first 
glance, we seem to switch problems fadishly. One source of the 
multiplication and change of problem should be seen as purely 
positive: sociologists use observational techniques and theory to 
illuminate areas of behavior previously reserved to other 
disciplines or not discussed at all. For example, in the last 
two decades the emotions, the production of culture, the 
mortality rates of organizational forms, and the routine grounds 
of everyday life have all lent themselves to sociological 
dissection. But part of the discontinuity in problem selection 
comes from the fact that we are a weak and unsophisticated 
humanistic discipline. I want to argue that in contrast to the 
physical and biological sciences, the social sciences, and 
especially sociology, are heavily dependent upon society as lived 
as a source of their problems. Willynilly we are caught in 
civilizational issues. Unfortunately, because we are a poor 
humanistic discipline, we lose sight of the roots of our problems 
and concerns. 
Problem Selection in a Ouasi-Science. Ouasi-Humanities 
The limits of sociology as a science stem not from 
methodology, nor from its particular architectionics. They stem 
from a misconception of the theoretical and substantive task of 
sociology; from a misconception of the sources of major 
substantive problems and how these relate to the structure of the 
discipline. In a nutshell, my argument is that the attempt to 
model our discipline on physics led us to search for universal 
laws; however, our real metier is the contextually qualified 
generalization about important social processes. (See Converse in 
Fiske and Schweder, 1985 for a parallel emphasis on contextually 
qualified generalizations.) Importance stems not only from the 
role of the process or concept in explaining social reality, 
which would be an internal, theoretical basis for establishing 
importance, but from the concern of scholars with civilizational 
values and outcomes. 
As I have already argued, because physics is (was) the 
exemplar of the natural sciences, sociologists often modeled 
their view of what the discipline should be on their views of its 
structure. The search was for a few fundamental concepts or 
elements related to each other in law like generalizations, 
through fundamental forces or mechanisms. The concepts had to be 
very general. Systems theory, structural-functional theory, 
conflict theory, and role theory were some of the more general 
and abstract formulations proposed as candidates. Or we have 
searched for the most elementary forms of the linkage between 
behavioral conditioning and status. Unfortunately, in almost 
every case the pursuit of theoretical elaboration at the most 
general level resulted in vacuous, banal, and boring 
generalizations, often contradicted by other generalizations. 
Each of these very general theoretical frameworks might lead to 
illuminating insights and rich data sets when applied by a 
social scientist with a feel for a particular historical- social 
context. Or, because of detailed elaboration, some facet of 
elementary behavior or of system functioning would come into 
view. Nevertheless, when pushed too far toward generality, the 
result often has seemed vacuous. Moreover, the application of 
these theoretical perspectives to particular cases has depended 
upon sensitivity, nuance and craft, not rigorous logical 
deduction. 
If a science is to be universalizing it needs elements that 
reasonably apply in all societies. While such concepts as 
"action" or "status" or "role" or "reward" or "differentiation" 
may apply universally, they take on meaning only when filled with 
cultural and civilizational content. 
There is another way to make the point. Assume that my 
argument about the nature of cumulation in a low consensus 
discipline is correct. If we were only a science, problems and 
solutions to problems would occur largely within the community of 
scholars. New problems would emerge largely in response to the 
progress and anomalies found in the debate within sub-disciplines 
and invisible colleges. Or new problems and methods would emerge 
at the intersection of sub-disciplines and invisble colleges, as 
progress and' change in one cross-fertilized others. I take it to 
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be the case that problem formulation, problem solution, and 
problem succession are largely internal matters in the physical 
and biological sciences. We consider societal intrusion into 
theory choice and problem choice an aberation in the natural 
sciences, even as we recognize that applied concerns shape the 
agenda of the natural sciences and as we recognize ethical limits 
to the conduct of experiments. Although the applied and 
civilizational embeddedness of physics, astronomy, and biology 
shape work to some extent, the basic elements of these 
disciplines and the core problems evolve with little political, 
moral and civilizat ional resonance. 
Some topics of sociology and the social sciences may evolve 
in response to purely internal puzzle and problem solution. 
Formal interactionism. and structuralism, material culture 
evolutionism and areas of socio-linguistics and micro behavior 
in sociology may have some of this autonomous and internal 
quality. But more often than not, the choice of problems, the 
definition of what is important, even the terms of analysis are 
freighted with political, moral and civilizational overtones. 
Although the scholar'attempts to distance herself from the more 
purely ideological and self serving definitions of the phenomena, 
the problems take on meaning precisely because they resonate with 
this larger social context. Indeed, when the work becomes too 
isolated from the concerns of the larger society and its 
civilizational context it begins to resemble a kind of 
technicism--problems without purpose. 
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An example from an area that borders on my own work in 
organizations may be useful. In the mid 1960s there developed a 
great interest in the formal structure of complex organizations. 
Originally stemming from civilizational concerns about the growth 
of the administrative state and the increasing dominance of 
managers and administrators, a number of sociologists and social 
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scientists began to systematically investigate the interrelation 
of organizational complexity, role differentiation, size, rules, 
delegation, and levels of authority. Early authors would be 
Berle and Means and Burnham, followed by Bendix, and in a more 
quantitative vein, Anderson and Warkov. This work was given 
great impetus by the group around Peter Blau in the united States 
and the so-called Aston group (~erek Pugh, David Hickson, and 
others) in Great Britain. Key articles were published in leading 
journals, and a flood tide of studies followed, including 
replications in several other countries. Finally, the whole 
enterprise ran out of gas. Later articles were published in the 
1ess.prestigious journals. And today, in 1988, the topic has 
almost disappeared from the agenda. Although textbooks still 
summarize the studies, they are rarely cited in scholarly 
journals. 
In one sense, this example illustrates the processes of 
normal science, as research findings accumulate and the research 
terrain is exhausted. But I think the more important lesson to be 
drawn is that in the process of developing statistical 
indicators, scholars lost sight of the relation of their specific 
empirical studies to the larger issues of authority and control. 
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Nowhere does the difference between sociology and the 
physical sciences show more clearly than in the way that major 
paradigmatic shifts occur. Although the claim can easily be 
overstated, shifts in the natural sciences occur because of 
events internal to the field of study. Theories don't predict, 
new measuring instruments reveal data not easily accounted for in 
the accepted paradigm, new formulations explain unaccounted for 
observations. Paradigm shifts in sociology may occur for these 
reasons, but the new paradigm is often a restatement, an 
intensification of older answers. For example, modern 
institutional theory, so ably developed by John Meyer, is an 
intensification and restatement of Weber's project on 
rationa'lization. Moreover, the press for reformulation may 
occur because of moral and political currents in the larger 
society; because events in the larger society and the moral and 
political evaluation of them lead one to reflect on the adequacy 
of current formulations.4 In both cases the reformulation 
reflects processes found in the humanities, more than it does 
those found in the sciences. 
A clear example is the ascendancy of world systems theory 
and dependency theory and the decline of convergence theory, a 
branch of modernization theory. Would anyone really argue that 
convergence theory was disproved? What we would be more likely 
to argue is that it miscast questions, or evaded critical issues. 
It led to one set of foci, rather than another set. And at least 
one part of the rejection of convergence theory came from moral 
and political concerns. Liberals wanted to emphasize the' 
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importance of civil liberties even though they recognized that 
totalitarian regimes have some dependence upon the passive 
consent of the governed. And radicals rejected convergence 
theory not because it was wrong, but because it ignored class and 
power in preserving industrial capitalism. On .the other hand, 
world systems theory developed out of a concern for the interplay 
of center and periphery in the modern world. It combined the 
moral fervor of Lenin with the long view of Braudel. It then 
played back into the historical-sociological analysis of western 
capitalism. 
Not only do our focal concerns' get shaped by the moral and 
politial currents of the larger society, but our answers (as 
noted above) are framed by major traditions of thought. No 
physicist rereads Newton or Einstein when searching for a 
solution to current problems. The laws or principles they 
developed are encapsulated in current formulations. If a current 
puzzle leads to deadends, they try to reformulate the puzzle. For 
sociologists, on the other hand, the classics represent major 
secular statements about civilizational issues. 
What did Weber or Marx really mean? Was the young Marx more 
important than the older Marx? In what ways is Weber superior to 
Durkheim? These are questions in the tradition of reading sacred 
books. In this case they are secular sacred books. They 
represent for sociology major and exemplary answers to enduring 
issues of social structure and social change. They are to 
Sociology what Shakespeare is to English literature and Plato is 
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to philosophy--exemplar treatments within the canon of enduring 
themes. 5 
The answers they provide also have moral and political 
overtones, they are not just alternative conceptual formulations. 
It would be possible for a conservative to use a Marxian analysis 
of capitalism, but reject the political implications. Yet the 
social implications of using such an analysis leads the 
conservative to disguise the origins of his analysis. 
The reliance on classic treatments is quite apparent in 
choice of paradigms for macro-issues in sociology. But the 
classics also play the same role in other areas. G. H. Mead 
provides one set of answers to the enduring question of the 
relation between self and society. Peirce is important for 
providing critical guidance in thinking about symbols, meaning 
'and society. Those questions are not important in every 
civilization. 
In a sense there are lodestone classics for each of the 
enduring civilizational themes. Returning to the. classic themes 
and the classic answers occurs as our common language usage 
shifts and as we attempt to refine and rethink our orientation in 
specific problem areas. As the focal concerns of scholars shift 
in the context of the larger society, different historic usages 
and analyses come to the fore. That resembles the procedures in 
the humanities more than it does those of the sciences. 
Socioloav as a Humanistic Disci~line 
To say that sociology is partly humanistic, drawing upon 
civilizational values and traditional modes of interpreting and 
understanding them, does not mean that we are a very good 
humanities discipline. We are not very self conscious in 
developing that aspect of our intellectual life. We are quite 
self conscious in organizing the scientific side of our 
enterprise. Issues of research design, of theory construction, of 
modes of analysis, are treated in most graduate programs, in 
journal articles and in textbooks. Moreover, even the exemplary 
current humanistic sociologists are more interested in justifying 
an interpretive, qualitative mode than they are in exploring the 
implications of their humanistic orientation for the organization 
of the discipline. They rarely take the humanistic disciplines 
seriously as models for methods or for the organization of 
knowledge. Unfortunately, some humanistic sociologists are more 
interested in sociology as moral suasion and social criticism 
than they are in the organization and cumulation of knowledge. 
Social criticism and interpretation is a useful function. But 
social criticism and interpretation without explicit comparison 
and concern for generalization leads us towards high level 
journalism--a kind of idiographic sociology-- or towards 
romanticism. (See the debate between Norman Denzin and Randall 
Collins, 1987) 
The fact that we are a weak humanistic discipline has 
several implications. Many of our theories and major pieces of 
research are sharply delimited by cultural biases that we are 
ill-equipped to recognize or deal with. Thus, concepts such as 
stratification or power are treated as universal properties in 
blissful ignorance of, for example, work by Fallers on African 
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stratification or Geertz on power among the Balinese that present 
a deep challenge to our hasty conceptualizations. We are 
tediously ahistorical. In my own major area, the theory of 
organizations, we write as if a timeless architectonics holds. We 
detach organizations from the surrounding socio-economic system. 
Poor Weber! We invoke him but ignore his assumptions. Finally, 
as a weak humanities, we ignore our linkages to fundamental 
philosophical issues and debates. We talk about normative orders 
without examining the history of ethics. We develop theories and 
research about distributive justice, equity, and equality with 
little attention to the long philosophical debates and 
interpretations of the terms. We develop a cognitive sociology 
without attending to historic debates about perception, signs, 
symbols, and epistemology. 
It is true that many philosophers, literary critics and 
classicists ignore the results of sociology, but that is their 
problem. It leads them to making distinctions without a 
difference, to deal with the extremes of moral issues, to ignore 
the psychological bases of audience response to literature 
without attention to the empirical range of real life 
situations. 
How different our courses would look, our alliances and 
inter-disciplinary contacts would be if we took these issues 
seriously. A few sociologists have of course bucked the trends. 
Phenomenologists have studied epistemology and have created a 
small bridge to linguistic philosophy. Some sociologists, such as 
James Coleman (1974, 1986) have recognized the absolute 
centrality of philosophy in both clarifying and chosing 
fundamental assumptions and in thinking about social policy. 
Philip Selznick (1961) has written persuasively on the role of 
the normative order for both the study of justice institutions 
and, with Gertrude Jaeger (Jaeger and Selznick, 1964) for the 
study of high culture. Joseph ~usfield'(l981) with his roots in 
symbolic interactionism and the literary-dramatistic methods of 
Kenneth Burke, pushes hard to reveal the moral drama and 
rhetorical styles involved in public policy formation. But these 
social scientists who bridge to the humanistic disciplines and 
tradition are not widely imitated. 
Conclusion: Proarammatic Im~lications of Beina A Ouasi- 
Humanistic Discipline 
The becoming a science model served us wel1,as a collective 
intellectual and'mobility project. In recent times, however, we 
have seen it challenged. Some parts of that challenge have been 
misconceived, since.we have held ourselves to an inappropriate 
scientific model, that of physics. We have been more successful 
as a science than we give ourselves credit for. Still, there are 
real limits to the sociological enterprise. We share many 
concerns with the humanistic disciplines. However, I believe it 
would be an intellectual and collective mobility mistake to 
abandon our concern for explanation, empirical evidence, and 
scope of generalization. Without these concerns we have little 
marginal advantage over social critics or social philosophers. 
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What would we do if we wanted to realize our potential both 
as a quasi-scientific and quasi humanistic discipline? One 
possibility would be for some departments to specialize in 
humanistic sociology. But, although it is a viable alternative 
for some departments, it misses the point for the discipline as a 
whole. If I am correct in my diagnosis, the problem is not that 
we need more sociologists who are appropriately trained in 
humanistic disciplines. The problem is how to maintain our 
interest in explanation, in systematic evidence and scope of 
generalization, at the same time enriching our conceptualization, 
nesting our analysis in deeper historical and cultural 
understanding, exploring less common-language definitions of key 
concepts and social processes. It is not enough to say "be . 
reflexivew--"be widely read." 
Any program must take into account the limited time 
available in doctoral programs, since students are often 
overburdened with requirments already. Several kinds of programs 
are possible, at the doctoral and post-doctoral training level, 
and in research enterprises. 
At the doctoral level one route might be for sociology to 
reconnect to anthropology. Since anthropology has covered some 
of the ground that I have been talking about, greater liasion of 
sociologists with anthropologists might be salutary. (I believe 
that anthropology has much to gain from such a liasion, as well, 
but I won't detail that now.) 
Secondly, doctoral students working on particular 
substantive problems should be encouraged to explore relevant 
courses in the humanities . Cognitive sociologists and 
phenomenologists could learn much from epistemology. 
Criminologists and sociologists of law might gain from courses in 
ethics and jurisprudence. Students in the sociology of the arts 
might be counseled to explore aesthetic theory. By appropriate 
changes in cognate and minor requirements, by judicious joint 
appointments, and by scrutiny of methods requirements, it might 
well be possible for even the mainline major postivist 
departments to better connect to humanistic studies. 
Post-doctoral programs might well be built around the 
intersection of sociology and the humanities. Two kinds of 
programs could be developed-- problem specific and disciplinary 
specific. - A problem specific post-doctoral program would focus 
upon a specific concept or theoretical intersection--justice, 
equality and inequality, language and society. A discipline 
specific program would explore the intersect of sociology with 
specific humanities disciplines--sociology and literature, 
sociology and philosophy, etc. These programs might be short- 
course programs--summer institutes, or individually tailored 
programs of one or two years at selected institutions. 
Finally, ways must be found to encourage senior scholars to 
explore collaborative research, to expand their intellectual 
horizons. Some senior sociologists such as Coleman, Joseph 
Gusfield, and Stephen Lukes already feel at ease in the land of 
the humanities. But more must be encouraged to cross the divide. 
Support for collaborative seminars, for conferences on specific 
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topics, and for interdisciplinary courses might be a good 
beginning. 
Would we find collaborators in the various humanities 
disciplines? There has been enormous ferment and change in the 
several humanities. It is clear that the barriers between history 
and sociology have been crumbling. Classicists have turned to 
sociology (a sociologist, Keith Hopkins, holds the Regius Chair 
of Classics at Cambridge); the challenge to the canon in English 
literature opens up the field to analysis of social structure and 
to the production of culture and audience relations; philosophers 
worry about the death of philosophy (~aynes, Bohman and McCarthy, 
1986) and some use sociology at the core of their analysis. 
(~ac~ntire, 1984) We should not expect a wholesale rapprochment 
with those fields currently distant, but a selective one is 
clearly feasible. We have much to learn from them, but they have 
much to learn from us as well. 
Of course, it may be objected, sociology is a mansion with 
many rooms; younger sociologists are already pursuing this . 
agenda. Certainly it is true that scholars such as Wendy Griswold 
(19871, with her training and interests in literature and 
sociology, and Guillermina Jasso (1980), with her background and 
training in philosophy and mathematics, begin to approach the 
intersect. My own perception is that many younger sociologists 
are pursuing critical and interpretive sociology, but at the 
expense of empirical and explanatory approaches. It is my faith 
that much is to be gained by interlocking our evidential and 
explanatory concerns with normative, interpretative and 
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hermeneutic analyses; that a creative tension develops by joining 
our scientific and humanistic aspirations and concerns. 
Footnoteq 
1. The disciplines we now label as humanities grew out of the 
humanistic movement of the Renaissance. It celebrated mankind and 
the achievements of civilization. These disciplines, the study 
oflanguage, literature,.philosophy and the arts had an 
interpretative and moral core. 
In contrast with the social sciences they have little commitment 
to replicable knowledge and the empirical testing of alternative 
explanations. On the other hand, more than the social sciences, 
they have been concerned with the history and intellectual roots 
of alternative patterns of thought and .creative production. 
2. Some of the readings that have been most helpful in thinking 
about the issues raised in this paper are to be.found in Gutting, 
editor, (1980) Fiske and Shweder (19851, and in Churchland and 
Hooker,(1985). 
3. A part of the debate over Kuhn's notions involve assertions he 
made about the incommensurability of theories and paradigms, 
which leads to a relativistic, non-progressive view of science. 
See Shapere, Stegmuller, and Blaug in Gutting, (1980). 
4. An earlier version of this paper included a separate section 
on the moral and political recruitment base of the discipline. 
For sake of clarity in an already overburdened argument I have 
left it out. 
5. In a personal communication Phil Converse argues that we have 
an advantage over the physical sciences in that as ongoing 
participants in a changing world, we can,reexamine our theories 
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as events bring them in to question. There are many revolutions 
that can be used to challenge our theories of political 
revolutions, but only few discoveries of super-nova that 
challenge astro-physical and cosmological theories. I would add, 
however, that what we take to be important events and our root 
interpretations of those events emerge from our own civilization, 
not from a detached theory. 
6. See Arthur Stinchcornbe's discussion (1982) on the role of the 
classics in the education of sociolgists. 
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